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The’mar~ipjto”bearedltedwith +x+ing fostered
vazmmein aeronsqtlos, but even there lte effeotson
velopmentshave not been a olear gain. The.qa@ led
/. . -, .
a great ad-
teohnhal d5-
to an SlqpP
sion of airoraftproductionfaoill~ies”whiahwas “impossibleto
. .
maintainunk peace oondittons,’&d the airoraftindustry finds
itself as a result saddledwith enormouspknts whose overhead
eats q the whole gross revenuenow obtainable.
In deql~ing, too, the returnto normal conditionshas been .
diffioult. The engineerwho oonoentratedhis attentionfor fuur
years on mllltaryrequirementsand servioealroraftfinds it dif-
floult to get baok to a normal state of mind and to interpret”the
re~uirementsof oo~eroial designwithmt bving the needs of the
army alwaysbefore him. Only in relativelyfew instsnoesdo the
commercialalror&&tproduoed Sinoe the ~istioe show evidenoeof
real attentionto oommer~al requirements~d.oo~lete indiffer-
ence to those ckraoteristlos of value only In time of.war.
Even as the SUrpluswar stoolc.disposedof at littlemore than
j- prioes Is the greatesthandioapwith whioh the Industryhas
to contendIn sellingnew maohines,so the warts le~oy to the de-
d.~er ha= made it diffioultfoz him to produoe new
whioh would be definitelysuperiorto those rebuilt
for the purpose of oommeroe. He must now starthis
from the oonmneroialpoint of view.
l Taken from ~The (2mistlanSoienoe Monitor.”
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The teohnioalrequirementsof oommeroialala!oraftq be.
groupedZn a generalway under the heads of safety, eoonmqranfi
cmmfort. Safetyand eoono~, especiallythe latter,offerproh
lams insuff~oientlyunderstoodas yet, especiallysinoe the re-
quirementsfor eoonomioaloperationand for avoidenoeof demger
often seem to be direotlyoontradiotory.
To inoreasethe safetyof airoraftmeans pzfa”lly to in-
.
mease the str’whral strength,to ellminatethe risk of foroed
landing,to make fires in the air ~qpossible,and to improvethe
stabilitymateriallymer that of the airplanesnow available.
The sub~eatof etruotural.strengthis one rather too teohni.oal.Zcr
discussionhere. Suftioe It to say that structuralfailuresosa
alwqTsbe overoometi that the strengthoan be made as great aa
proves to be neoessary.
~tru-al problemsare never Ipsoluble.
The questionof eliminatinga foroed landlng opens more tr*-
eresting possibilities. Of oourse,only a Wqy smallpementag=/
of foroed landings lead to any serioustroubleat present. T@
are, however,an ever-presenthasard,and in flying over desert.
mountainox jungleor in flying at night, a foroed landingmay
easilybeome ths almost oertainprecursoryof disaster. While
statisticsdo not exist, it is probably safe to say tkat 85 per
oent of the forged landtngswhioh ooour at the present time are
ohazgeableto the power plant, mibstantlallyall of the remainder
being due to fog or other bad weather co&litions. A foroed land-
ing due to weather,of cxmrse,is as a rule less dangerous.than
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that ari sing ftom
plaoe and time of
—
Ma+
engine trouble,as the pi~ut aan ohoosehis O=
deeoentwithin tide limits in the first dase,
while he tiat oohe down at onoe whereverhe Is If the engine”:
atcps. Furt~ermore,of the ladings resultingfrom eriglnetrou-
Me, it ia ~robable that at least nine out of ten a~ise from dtf-
fioultywith s&e one of the engineaocessorles,suohas the fiel “
r
feed szrangements~“thelubricationsystem,or the ignlt.lon.Only
very rarely is an airplaneforoed to desoendby bzeeXingof a
etrudural part of the engine itself. The problem of eliminating
foroed lsmdlngsthen bsoomes a problem of cuttingdown the fail-
ures of these accessories or of supplyingthem in duplioateso
that the failure of a singleone wI1l not recluirea deaoento .
The zellabilltyla being Imprwed continually,but it.is too
muoh to hope
designedand
times. Some
that It will ever be perfeot. There is no maohine
built by human belnga whioh does not break down at
of them have a very perfeot reoord,but there is none
. which is perfeot enough to $mtify stakingthe lives of passenger
and orew on its continuedfunotionlng,- there ia no reaaonto
think that the alrpleneengine
the rule in this =espeot. The
foroed landtngaFpearsthen to
oation of units performingthe
will ever prove an exoeptionto “
only real hope of suppressingthe
lie in the duplloationor multlpli-
same funotion.
DuplicateF5uGnea.
—
The
ad many
duplicationof.power planta has frequentlybeen praotioed,
of the most suooessfulmilitarymaohinesproduoed in this
countryhave two sqmrate enginesset out on the wings and each
.—. .—-— -.. — . ..-
drivingits own propeller. PwM the”oknemial standpoint,ho=
ever, the use of two engines. on *he wings cadnotbe regardedas a
. .
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eatlsfaotorysolution. If the use of two engines1s to p=ove a
real s@eguard la oass of trouble,it is neoessary that the air-
plane be oepablefor a flying levelwith one engine ocm@etely
out off and mrrying the other as a dead load. This re&irement
is not oompatlblewith eoonomy or real mmmerolal.efi!loienoy,as
the oommerolalairplanemust have only a smallmargin of power .
under normal ocnxlitlonsif tt Is to be operatedat reaso=ble
00et. Anotherdisadvantageof the two-enginemaohlnewith the en-
gines on the wings IS that when one engine Is stoppedthe push of
.
the otherpropelleris so far off oenter that it is almost IWO-
sible to hold a straightoourse towarda desired point, the unbal-
anced propellerthrust tending to swing the airplanearound. We
shouldnot then expeetvery muoh from the use of two engines.
The use of three or four offersa mmh more attractiveout-
look. The design of a maohine to operatewith satisfactoryeoon-
omy and able to fly with three engines out of four is a muoh sim-
pler propos.ltlonthan obtainingthe ability to fly with one out
of two. It a~ears thm that the airplaneof the future,
insofaras maohinesto be u6ed over diffloultoountryand
night flying are conoerned,must be possessedof.multlple
plants. ..
Inmrovin@Stability.
.
After the f’oroedlanding,the most prol~fio oause of
at least
for
po=er
aooldent
in flight is instatiiiltyand loss of omtrol of one sort or anoth-
--- — —. -.-——— ----
er. ExtensiveSXpefiment-Q be~ oollddO*G)d~th a V~~W tO _
. .
proving stability&d oontroiof airpl.eaes,”and _&M’& resuits”
..
.,
.-.,-..,-
“ h-av-e’bkkn c%taind, so t~t ‘it”1s”now a &*onpl&” for a maohtie
to be able to fly-fora oonelderableperibd:without the pllotls
.
touo~ng the oontrols. The gain aooomplishedby”meremodifica-
tions & c19si~ Is so great that the dwelopment of automatlod=
vioes for the purposes of stabilizingthe &irpl.anehardly seems
ndoeseary. Thkt, however,Is a lazge sub~e~ worthy of separa.t.e
study. The only foe that really
realm of Instabilityis the tail
to turn from a low altitudewith
ers and studentsof aerodynamics
remainsto be vanciulshedin ths
spin resultingfrom &ttempting
insufficientpower. When desl~
have learnedto produce airplanes
inoapableof spinning,there will have been accomplishedthe lori~
est single step that remainsto be taken on the path to oomplete
0af9ty.
Featuresof economydiotate that the airplaneshall operate
with a small reserveof power and aca)rdingly at a low fuel cost.
They also requirethat the depreciationof the structureshallbe
Slo’r.The deteriorationof alroraftat the present time is muoh “
more”rapid than It shouldbe, and they oannotbe consideredsatis-
factoryfor comraerolaluse until the present life of the engine
Is at least tripledand that of the most vulnerableparts of the
airplaneis oonsidesablyinorease~ In’partloular,the use of fa:c
rlo for oove~ingthe wings and body of oommerola.1maohinesis in-
tolerable, as It is neoessazyto reouveswings with fabrio several
,.
—
-60-
times before the internalstrudnme nee~e to Beioverhauled. Ths
developmentof wing
metal are among the
have yet appeare~
mrerings of light veneer
most promisingstruotual
and of thin sheet
Improvements that
As for the engine’sinoreasedlife and inoreasedreliability~
.
neoess~ both for safe~and eoonomy,they find a oomfon solutZou
Both
~ith
less
mean Increasedweight of the engine. It is irnpraotioable
e.zi st ing knowledge of matezkls to build engines mighing
%han tm pomcls per horsepower whioh will give the durablli--
ty and steadiness of operation necessary If the
ously to oompet e witln other means of transport ~
load must be saorifioed by adding weight to the
airplane is seri-
and some useful
engine, bringing
it up to three or possiblyfour pounds for every horsepower,
.
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